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MULTI-OBJECTIVE LINEAR QUADRATIC TEAM OPTIMIZATION ∗
ATHER GATTAMI †
Abstract. In this paper, we consider linear quadratic team problems with an arbitrary number
of quadratic constraints in both stochastic and deterministic settings. The team consists of players
with different measurements about the state of nature. The objective of the team is to minimize a
quadratic cost subject to additional finite number of quadratic constraints. We will first consider the
Gaussian case, where the state of nature is assumed to have a Gaussian distribution, and show that
the linear decisions are optimal and can be found by solving a semidefinite program We then consider
the problem of minimizing a quadratic objective for the worst case scenario, subject to an arbitrary
number of deterministic quadratic constraints. We show that linear decisions can be found by solving
a semidefinite program.
Key words. Team Decision Theory, Game Theory, Convex Optimization.
AMS subject classifications. 99J04, 49K04
1. Introduction. We consider the problem of distributed decision making
with information constraints under linear quadratic settings. For instance, in-
formation constraints appear naturally when making decisions over networks.
These problems can be formulated as team problems. The team problem is an
optimization problem with several decision makers possessing different informa-
tion aiming to optimize a common objective. Early results in [11] considered
static team theory in stochastic settings and a more general framework was
introduced by Radner [12], where existence and uniqueness of solutions where
shown. Connections to dynamic team problems for control purposes where intro-
duced in [9]. In [4], the team problem with two team members was solved. The
solution cannot be easily extended to more than two players since it uses the fact
that the two members have common information; a property that doesn’t neces-
sarily hold for more than two players. Also, a nonlinear team problem with two
team members was considered in [2], where one of the teammembers is assumed
to have full information whereas the other member has only access to partial in-
formation about the state of the world. Related team problems with exponential
cost criterion were considered in [10]. Optimizing team problems with respect
to affine decisions in a minimax quadratic cost was shown to be equivalent to
stochastic team problems with exponential cost, see [5]. The connection is not
clear when the optimization is carried out over nonlinear decision functions. The
deterministic version (minimizing the worst case scenario) of the linear quadratic
team decision problem was solved in [8].
In this paper, we will consider both Gaussian and deterministic settings(worst
case scenario) for team decision problems under additional quadratic constraints.
It’s well-known that additional constraints, although convex, could give rise to
complex optimization problems if the optimized variables are functions (as op-
posed to real numbers). For instance linear functions, that is functions of the
form µ(x) = Kx where K is a real matrix, are no longer optimal. We will illus-
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trate this fact by the following example:
EXAMPLE 1. For x ∈ R, we want to minimize the objective function
|u|2
subject to
|x− u|2 ≤ γ
Some Hilbert space theory shows that the optimal u is given by
u = µ(x) = (|x| − √γ)x/|x| if |x|2 > γ,
and
u = µ(x) = 0 otherwise.
Obviously, the optimal u is a nonlinear function of x.
Increasing the dimension of x, and adding constraints on the structure of
u, for instance x ∈ RN and u = µ(x) = (µ(x1), .., µ(xN )), certainly makes the
constrained optimization more complicated. The example above shows that, in
spite of having a convex optimization carried out over a Hilbert space, the optimal
decision function is nonlinear. However, we show in the upcoming sections that
multi-objective problems behave nicely when considering the expected values of
the objectives in the Gaussian case, in the sense that linear decisions are optimal.
For the deterministic counterpart which is not an optimization problem over a
Hilbert space, we show how to find the linear optimal decisions by semidefinite
programming. However, the optimality of the linear decisions remains and open
question.
2. Notation. The following table gives a list of the notation we are going to
usee throughout the text:
S
n The set of n× n symmetric matrices.
Sn+ The set of n× n symmetric positive
semidefinite matrices.
Sn++ The set of n× n symmetric positive
definite matrices.
M The set of measurable functions.
C The set of functions µ : Rp → Rm with
µ(y) = (µT1 (y1), µ
T
2 (y2), ..., µ
T
N (yN ))
T ,
µi : R
pi → Rmi ,∑imi = m,∑i pi = p.
[A]ij The element of A in position (i, j).
 A  B ⇐⇒ A−B ∈ Sn+.
≻ A ≻ B ⇐⇒ A−B ∈ Sn++.
⊗ The Kronecker binary operation
between two matrices A and B, A⊗B.
Tr Tr[A] is the trace of the matrix A.
N (m,X) The set of Gaussian variables with
mean m and covariance X .
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3. Linear Quadratic Gaussian Team Theory. In this section we will re-
view some classical results in stochastic team theory with new simpler proofs for
the linear quadratic case, that first appeared in [6] and [7].
In the static team decision problem, one would like to solve
min
µ
E
[
x
u
]T [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
] [
x
u
]
subject to yi = Cix+ vi
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N.
(3.1)
Here, x and v are independent Gaussian variables taking values in Rn and Rp,
respectively, with x ∼ N (0, Vxx) and v ∼ N (0, Vvv). Also, yi and ui will be stochas-
tic variables taking values in Rpi , Rmi , respectively, and p1 + ... + pN = p. We
assume that [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
]
∈ Sm+n, (3.2)
and Quu ∈ Sm++, m = m1 + · · ·+mN .
If full state information about x is available to each decision maker ui, the
minimizing u can be found easily by completion of squares. It is given by u = Lx,
where L is the solution to
QuuL = −Qux.
Then, the cost function in (3.1) can be rewritten as
J(x, u) = E{xT (Qxx − LTQuuL)x}+E{(u− Lx)TQuu(u− Lx)}. (3.3)
Minimizing the cost function J(x, u), is equivalent to minimizing
E{(u− Lx)TQuu(u− Lx)},
since nothing can be done about E{xT (Qxx−LTQuuL)x} (the cost when u has full
information).
The next theorem is due to Radner [12], but we give a different formulation
and proof that is simpler, which relies on the structure of the linear quadratic
Gaussian setting:
THEOREM 1. Let x and vi be Gaussian variables with zero mean, taking
values in Rn and Rpi , respectively, with p1+ ...+pN = p. Also, let ui be a stochastic
variable taking values in Rmi , Quu ∈ Sm++, m = m1 + · · · +mN , L ∈ Rm×n, Ci ∈
Rpi×n, for i = 1, ..., N . Then, the optimal decision µ to the optimization problem
min
µ
E{(u− Lx)TQuu(u− Lx)}
subject to yi = Cix+ vi
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N.
(3.4)
is unique and linear in y.
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Proof. Let Z be the linear space of functions such that z ∈ Z if zi is a linear
transformation of yi, that is zi = Aiyi for some real matrix Ai ∈ Rmi×pi . Since
Quu ≻ 0, Z is a linear space under the inner product
〈g, h〉 = E{gTQuuh},
and norm
||g||2 = E{gTQuug}.
The optimization problem in (3.4) where we search for the linear optimal decision
can be written as
min
u∈Z
||u− Lx||2 (3.5)
Finding the best linear optimal decision u∗ ∈ Z to the above problem is equiv-
alent to finding the shortest distance from the subspace Z to the element Lx,
where the minimizing u∗ is the projection of Lx on Z, and hence unique. Also,
since µ∗ is the projection, we have
0 = 〈u∗ − Lx, µ〉 = E{(u∗ − Lx)TQuuu},
for all u ∈ Z. In particular, for fi = (0, 0, ..., zi, 0, ..., 0) ∈ Z, we have
E{(u∗ − Lx)TQuufi} = E{[(u∗ − Lx)TQuu]izi} = 0.
The Gaussian assumption implies that [(u∗(y)−Lx)TQuu]i is independent of zi =
Aiyi, for all linear transformations Ai. This gives in turn that [(u
∗ − Lx)TQuu]i
is independent of yi. Hence, for any decision µ ∈ M ∩ C, linear or nonlinear, we
have that
E(u∗ − Lx)TQuuµ(y) =
∑
i
E{[(u∗ − Lx)TQuu]iµi(yi)} = 0,
and
E(µ(y)−Lx)TQuu(µ(y)− Lx)
= E(u∗ − Lx+ µ(y)− u∗)TQuu(u∗ − Lx+ µ(y)− u∗)
= E(u∗ − Lx)TQuu(u∗ − Lx) +E(µ(y)− u∗)TQuu(µ(y)− u∗)
+ 2E(u∗ − Lx)TQuu(µ(y)− u∗)
= E(u∗ − Lx)TQuu(u∗ − Lx) +E(µ(y)− u∗)TQuu(µ(y)− u∗)
≥ E(u∗ − Lx)TQuu(u∗ − Lx)
with equality if and only if µ(y) = u∗. This concludes the proof.
PROPOSITION 1. Let x and vi be independent Gaussian variables taking val-
ues in Rn and Rpi , respectively with x ∼ N (0, Vxx), v ∼ N (0, Vvv). Also, let ui
be a stochastic variable taking values in Rmi , m = m1 + · · · +mN , Qxu ∈ Rn×m,
Quu ∈ Sm++, Ci ∈ Rpi×n, and L = −Q−1uuQux. Set yi = Cix + vi. Then, the optimal
solution K1, ...,KN to the optimization problem
min
Ki
E(u− Lx)TQuu(u− Lx)
subject to ui = Kiyi
for i = 1, ..., N.
(3.6)
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is the solution of the linear system of equations
N∑
j=1
[Quu]ijKj(CjVxxC
T
i + [Vvv]ji) = −[Qux]iVxxCTi , for i = 1, ..., N. (3.7)
Proof. Let K = diag(K1, ...,KN ) and C =
[
CT1 · · · CTN
]T
. The problem of
finding the optimal linear feedback law ui = Kiyi can be written as
min
Ki
Tr[E{Quu(u − Lx)(u− Lx)T }]
subject to u = K(Cx+ v)
(3.8)
Now
f(K) = Tr E{Quu(u− Lx)(u − Lx)T }
= Tr E{Quu(KCx+Kv − Lx)(KCx+Kv − Lx)T }
= Tr
[
E{QuuK(CxxTCT + vvT )KT − 2QuuLxxTCTKT
+QuuLxx
TLT + 2Quu(KC − L)xvTKT}
]
= Tr
[
QuuK(CVxxC
T + Vvv)K
T − 2QuuLVxxCTKT +QuuLVxxLT )
]
= Tr

 N∑
i,j=1
[Quu]ijKj(CjVxxC
T
i + [Vvv]ji)K
T
i − 2
N∑
i,j=1
[Quu]ijLjVxxC
T
i K
T
i


+Tr[QuuLVxxL
T ].
(3.9)
A minimizing K is obtained by solving ∇Kif(K) = 0:
0 = ∇Kif(K)
= 2
N∑
j=1
[Quu]ijKj(CjVxxC
T
i + [Vvv]ji)− 2
N∑
j=1
[Quu]ijLjVxxC
T
i .
(3.10)
Since QuuL = −Qux, we get that∑N
j=1[Quu]ijLjVxxC
T
i = −[Qux]iVxxCTi ,
and the equality in (3.10) is equivalent to∑N
j=1[Quu]ijKj(CjVxxC
T
i + [Vvv]ji) = −[Qux]iVxxCTi ,
and the proof is complete.
In general, separation does not hold for the static team problem when con-
straints on the information available for every decision maker ui are imposed.
That is, the optimal decision is not given by ui = Lxˆi, where xˆi is the optimal
estimated value of x by decision maker i. We show it by considering the following
example.
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the team problem
minimize E
[
x
u
]T [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
] [
x
u
]
subject to yi = Cix+ vi
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N
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The data we will consider is:
N = 2, C1 = C2 = 1, x ∼ N (0, 1), v1 ∼ N (0, 1), v2 ∼ N (0, 1)
Qxx = 1, Quu =
[
2 1
1 2
]
, Qxu = Q
T
ux = −
[
1 1
]
The best decision with full information is given by
u = −Q−1uuQuxx =
[
2
3
− 1
3− 1
3
2
3
] [
1
1
]
x =
[
1
3
1
3
]
x.
The optimal estimate of x of decision maker 1 is
xˆ1 = E{x|y1} = 1
2
y1,
and of decision maker 2
xˆ2 = E{x|y2} = 1
2
y2.
Hence, the decision where each decision maker combines the best deterministic
decision with her best estimate of x is given by
ui =
1
3
xˆi =
1
6
yi,
for i = 1, 2. This policy gives a cost equal to 0.611. However, solving the team
problem yieldsK1 = K2 =
1
5
, and hence the optimal team decision is given by
ui =
1
5
yi.
The cost obtained from the team problem is 0.600. Clearly, separation does not
hold in team decision problems.
4. TeamDecisionProblemswith Power Constraints. Consider the mod-
ified version of the optimization problem (3.1):
min
µ
E
[
x
u
]T [
Q S
ST R
] [
x
u
]
subject to yi = Cix
ui = µi(yi)
γi ≥ E‖µi(yi)‖2
for i = 1, ..., N.
(4.1)
The difference from Radner’s original formulation is that we have added power
constraints to the decision functions, γi ≥ E‖µi(yi)‖2.
In optimization (minimization) problems, you define the value to be infinite
if there doesn’t exist any feasible decision variable that satisfy the constraints.
Therefore, usually, one assumes that there is a feasible point, and hence the
value must be finite. Existence conditions are hard to derive usually in spite
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of problems might be convex. So in practice, you run the algorithm and either
you get a finite number, or it goes indefinitely. Conditions where you a decide
whether you have a feasible problem or not are of great interest of course. It’s a
nontrivial problem that is outside the scope of this paper.
In the sequel, we will prove a more general theorem, where we consider
power constraints on a set of quadratic forms in both the state x and the decision
function µ.
THEOREM 2. Let x be a Gaussian variable with zero mean and given co-
variance matrix X , taking values in Rn. Also, let
[
Q0 S0
ST0 R0
]
∈ Sm+n+ , R0 ∈ Sm++,[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
]
∈ Sm+n, and Rj ∈ Sm+ , for j = 1, ...,M . Assume that the optimization
problem
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T [
Q0 S0
ST0 R0
] [
x
µ(x)
]
subject to E
[
x
µ(x)
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
≤ γj
j = 1, ...,M
(4.2)
is feasible. Then, linear decisions µ given by µ(x) = K(X)x, with K(X) ∈ K, are
optimal.
Proof. Consider the expression
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T [
Q0 S0
ST0 R0
] [
x
µ(x)
]
+
M∑
j=1
λj
(
E
[
x
µ(x)
] [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
− γj
)
.
Take the expectation of a quadratic form with index j to be larger than γj . Then,
λj → ∞ makes the value of the expression above infinite. On the other hand,
if the expectation of a quadratic form with index j is smaller than γj , then the
maximizer λj is optimal for λj = 0.
Now let p⋆ be the optimal value of the optimization problem (4.2), and con-
sider the objective function
[
x
u
]T [
Q0 S0
ST0 R0
] [
x
u
]
= xT (Q0 − S0R−10 ST0 )x+ (u−R−10 ST0 x)TR0(u−R−10 ST0 x).
We have that Q0 − S0R−10 ST0  0, since it’s the Schur complement of R0 in the
positive semi-definite matrix
[
Q0 S0
ST0 R0
]
. Since R0 ≻ 0, a necessary condition for
the objective function to be zero is that u = R−10 S
T
0 x, and so u must be linear (In
order for u to have the structure given by C, R−1
0
ST0 must be in K, to satisfy the
information constraints).
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Now assume that p⋆ > 0. We have
p
⋆ = min
µ∈C
max
λi∈R+
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T [
Q0 S0
ST0 R0
] [
x
µ(x)
]
+
M∑
j=1
λj
(
E
[
x
µ(x)
] [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
− γj
)
= min
µ∈C
max
λi∈R+
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T ([
Q0 S0
ST0 R0
]
+
M∑
j=1
λi
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
])[
x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj .
(4.3)
Now introduce λ0 and the matrix
[
Q S
ST R
]
=
M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
]
,
and consider the minimax problem
p0 = min
µ∈C
max
λj≥0∑M
j=0
λj=1
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T [
Q S
ST R
] [
x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj . (4.4)
Note that a maximizing λ0 must be positive, since λ0 = 0 implies that p0 ≤ 0,
while λ0 > 0 gives p0 > 0. We can always recover the optimal solutions of (4.3)
from that of (4.4) by dividing all variables by λ0, that is p
⋆ = p0/λ0, λj 7→ λj/λ0,
and µ 7→ µ/λ0. Now we have the obvious inequality (minmax{·} ≥ maxmin{·})
p0 ≥ max
λj≥0∑M
j=0
λj=1
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T  M∑
j=1
λj
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
][ x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj .
For any fixed values of λj , we have R ≻ 0, so Theorem 1 gives the equality
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
] [
Q S
ST R
] [
x
µ(x)
]
= min
K∈K
E
[
x
Kx
] [
Q S
ST R
] [
x
Kx
]
,
where the minimizing K is unique. Thus,
p0 ≥ max
λj≥0
∑M
j=0 λj=1
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T ( M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
])[
x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
= max
λj≥0
∑M
j=0 λj=1
min
K∈K
E
[
x
Kx
]T ( M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
])[
x
Kx
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj .
The objective function is radially unbounded in K since R ≻ 0. Hence, it can be
restricted to a compact subset of K. Thus,
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p0 ≥ max
λj≥0∑M
j=0
λj=1
min
K∈K
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T  M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
][ x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
= min
K∈K
max
λj≥0∑
M
j=0
λj=1
E
[
x
Kx
]T  M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
][ x
Kx
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
≥ min
µ∈C
max
λj≥0∑
M
j=0
λj=1
E
[
x
µ(x)
]T  M∑
j=0
λi
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
][ x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
= p0,
where the equality is obtained by applying Proposition 2 in the Appendix, the
second inequality follows from the fact that the set of linear decisionsKx,K ∈ K,
is a subset of C, and the second equality follows from the definition of p0. Hence,
linear decisions are optimal, and the proof is complete.
Remark: Although Theorem 2 is stated and proved for y = x and u = µ(y) =
µ(x), it extends easily to the case y = Cx for any matrix C, which often is the
case in applications.
5. Computation of The Optimal TeamDecisions. The optimization prob-
lem that we would like to solve when assuming linear decisions is
min
γ0,K∈K
γ0
subject to E
[
x
KCx
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
≤ γj , j = 0, ...,M,
x ∼ N (0, X2).
(5.1)
Note that we can write the constraints as
E
[
x
KCx
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
= E
{
Tr
[
I
KC
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
I
KC
]
xxT
}
= TrX
[
I
KC
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
I
KC
]
X,
(5.2)
where we used that ExxT = X2. Hence, we obtain a set of convex quadratic
inequalities (convex since Rj  0 for all j)
TrX
[
I
KC
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
I
KC
]
X ≤ γj .
There are many existing computational methods to solve convex quadratic opti-
mization problems (see [3]).
Alternatively, we can formulate the optimization problem as a set of linear
matrix inequalities as follows. For simplicity, we will assume that Rj ≻ 0 for all
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j (The case Rj  0 is analogue with some technical conditions).
THEOREM 3. The team optimization problem (5.1) is equivalent to the semi-
definite program
min
γ0,K∈K
γ0
subject to TrPj ≤ γj
0 
[
Pj −XQjX −XSjKCX −XCTKTSTj X XCTKTRj
RjKCX Rj
]
j = 0, ...,M.
(5.3)
Proof. Introduce the matrices Pj ∈ Sn, and write the given constraints as
γj ≥ TrPj
Pj −X
[
I
KC
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
I
KC
]
X  0. (5.4)
Now we have that
0  X
[
I
KC
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
I
KC
]
X
= Pj −XQjX −XSjKCX −XCTKTSTj X −XCTKTRjKCX.
(5.5)
Since Rj ≻ 0, the quadratic inequality above can be transformed to a linear
matrix inequality using the Schur complement ([3]), which is given by
[
Pj −XQjX −XSjKCX −XCTKTSTj X XCTKTRj
RjKCX Rj
]
 0.
Hence, our optimization problem to be solved is given by
min
K∈K
γ0
subject to TrPj ≤ γj
0 
[
Pj −XQjX −XSjKCX −XCTKTSTj X XCTKTRj
RjKCX Rj
]
j = 0, ...,M,
(5.6)
which proves our theorem.
6. Minimax Team Theory. We considered the problem of static stochastic
team decision in the previous sections. This section treats an analogous version
for the deterministic (or worst case) problem. Although the problem formulation
is very similar, the ideas of the solution are considerably different, and in a sense
more difficult.
The deterministic problem considered is a quadratic game between a team
of players and nature. Each player has limited information that could be differ-
ent from the other players in the team. This game is formulated as a minimax
problem, where the team is the minimizer and nature is the maximizer.
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6.1. Deterministic Team Problems. Consider the following team decision
problem
inf
µ
sup
x 6=0
J(x, u)
||x||2
subject to yi = Cix
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N
(6.1)
where ui ∈ Rmi , m = m1 + · · ·+mN , Ci ∈ Rpi×n.
J(x, u) is a quadratic cost given by
J(x, u) =
[
x
u
]T [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
] [
x
u
]
,
where [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
]
∈ Sm+n.
We will be interested in the case Quu ≻ 0. The players u1,..., uN make up a team,
which plays against nature represented by the vector x, using µ ∈ S, that is
µ(Cx) =


µ1(C1x)
...
µN (CNx)

 .
THEOREM 4. If the value of the game (6.1) is equal to γ∗, then there is a linear
decision µ(Cx) = KCx, with K = diag(K1, ...,KN ), achieving that value.
Proof. For a proof, consult [8].
6.2. Relation with The Stochastic Minimax Team Decision Problem.
Now consider the stochastic minimax team decision problem
min
K
max
E‖x‖2=1
E
{
xT
[
I
KC
]T [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
] [
I
KC
]
x
}
.
Taking the expectation of the cost in the stochastic problem above yields the
equivalent problem
min
K
max
TrX=1
Tr
[
I
KC
]T [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
] [
I
KC
]
X
whereX is a positive semi-definite matrix, and is the covariance matrix of x, i. e.
X = E xxT . Hence, we see that the stochastic minimax team problem is equiva-
lent to the deterministic minimax team problem, where nature maximizes with
respect to all covariance matrices X of the stochastic variable x with variance
E ‖x‖2 = E xTx = Tr X = 1.
7. Deterministic Team Problems with Quadratic Constraints. Con-
sider the team problem (6.1). An equivalent condition for the existence of a deci-
sion function µ⋆ ∈ C that achieves the value of the game γ⋆ is that[
x
µ⋆(Cx)
]T [
Q S
ST R
] [
x
µ⋆(Cx)
]
≤ γ⋆‖x‖2
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for all x, which is equivalent to
[
x
µ⋆(Cx)
]T [
Q− γ⋆I S
ST R
] [
x
µ⋆(Cx)
]
≤ 0
for all x. This is an example of a power constraint. We could also have a set of
power constraints that have to be mutually satisfied. For instance, in addition to
the minimization of the worst case quadratic cost, we could have constraints on
the induced norms of the decision functions
‖µi(Cix)‖2
‖x‖2 ≤ γi for all x 6= 0, i = 1, ...,M,
or equivalently given by the quadratic inequalities
‖µi(Cix)‖2 − γi‖x‖2 ≤ 0 for all x, i = 1, ...,M.
Also, the team members could share a common power source, and the power is
proportional to the squared norm of the decisions µi:
M∑
i=1
‖µi(Cix)‖2 − c‖x‖2 ≤ 0 for all x,
for some positive real number c.
It’s not clear whether linear decisions are optimal, since the example give at
the introduction indicates that, in deterministic settings, nonlinear decision are
optimal. However, the next result shows how to obtain the linear optimal deci-
sions by solving a semidefinite program.
THEOREM 5. Let Ci ∈ Rpi×n, for i = 1, ..., N . Let
[
Qj Sj
STj Rj
]
∈ Sm+n for
j = 0, ...,M , and Rj ∈ Sm+ for 0 = 1, ...,M . Then, the set of quadratic matrix
inequalities
[
x
KCx
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
≤ 0 ∀x, j = 0, ...,M, (7.1)
is equivalent to[
Qj + SjKC + C
TKTSTj C
TKTRj
RjKC −Rj
]
 0, i = 0, ...,M. (7.2)
Proof. We have the following chain of inequalities:
[
x
KCx
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
≤ 0
m
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[
I
KC
]T [
Qj Sj
STj Rj
] [
I
KC
]
 0
m
Qj + SjKC + C
TKTSTj + C
TKTRjKC  0
m
A =
[
Qj + SjKC + C
TKTSTj C
TKTRj
RjKC −Rj
]
 0,
where the last equivalence follows from taking the Schur complement of Rj in A
(see [3]). Hence, our optimization problem becomes[
Qj + SjKC + C
TKTSTj C
TKTRj
RjKC −Rj
]
 0, i = 0, ...,M. (7.3)
This completes the proof.
8. Conclusions. We have studiedmulti-objective linear quadratic optimiza-
tion of team decisions in both stochastic and deterministic settings. Constrained
decision problems tend to have nonlinear optimal solutions. We have shown that
for the Gaussian setting, linear decisions are in fact optimal, and we can find
the linear optimal solutions by solving a semidefinite program. We then explore
the problem of finding the linear optimal decisions for its deterministic counter-
part and show that we can find the optimal solution by solving a semidefinite
program. Future work will consider optimality of the linear decisions in the de-
terministic framework. Another problem of interest is an an S-procedure sort
of a result, where we want to find decision function µ such that the inequality
J0(µ(x), x) ≤ 0 is satisfied if J1(µ(x), x) ≤ 0, where J0, J1 are some quadratic
forms in µ and x. However, this is a much harder problem since the search for
linear function µ(x) is not a covnex problem, and it’s not clear if it can be convex-
ified.
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Appendix.
Game theory. Let J = J(u,w) be a functional defined on a product vector
space U×W, to be minimized by u ∈ U ⊂ U and maximized by w ∈ W ⊂W, where
U andW are the constrained sets. This defines a zero-sum game, with kernel J ,
in connection with which we can introduce two values, the upper value
J¯ := inf
u∈U
sup
w∈W
J(u,w),
and the lower value
J := sup
w∈W
inf
u∈U
J(u,w).
Obviously, we have the inequality J¯ ≥ J . If J¯ = J = J⋆, then J⋆ is called the
value of the zero-sum game. Furthermore, if there exists a pair (u⋆ ∈ U,w⋆ ∈ W )
such that
J(u⋆, w⋆) = J⋆,
then the pair (u⋆, w⋆) is called a (pure-strategy) saddle-point solution. In this
case, we say that the game admits a saddle-point (in pure strategies). Such a
saddle-point solution will equivalently satisfy the so-called pair of saddle-point
inequalities:
J(u⋆, w) ≤ J(u⋆, w⋆) ≤ J(u,w⋆), ∀u ∈ U, ∀w ∈W.
PROPOSITION 2. Consider a two-person zero-sum game on convex finite di-
mensional action sets U1×U2, defined by the continuous kernel J(u1, u2). Suppose
that J(u1, u2) is strictly convex in u1 and strictly concave in u2. Suppose that
either
(i) U1 and U2 are closed and bounded, or
(ii) Ui ⊆ Rmi , i = 1, 2, and J(u1, u2) → ∞ as ‖u1‖ → ∞, and J(u1, u2) → −∞
as ‖u2‖ → ∞.
Then, the game admits a unique pure-strategy saddle-point equilibrium.
Proof. See [1], pp. 177.
Remark. The assumption of strict convexity and concavity in Proposition 2
can be relaxed to only convexity and concavity, and a saddle-point exists in pure
strategies, but it is not necessarily unique.
